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Andrew D. Heard* Military Law and the
Charter of Rights
I. Introduction
Substantial re-evaluations of the rules ordering many facets of Canadian
society have been required since the introduction of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, both as a consequence and in anticipation of challenges in
the courts. The military community in particular has been faced with
extensive difficulties because of the adoption of the Charter of Rights by
its parent civilian society. The dilemma the military finds itself in stems
from the creation of the Charter by civilian politicians and lawyers who
had the problems of a civilian society and legal system in mind; yet it
applies equally to the military.' Although the Forces have adopted a
number of changes in order to accommodate the Charter, there still
remains a broad range of long-established military policies which could
face challenges in the courts for limiting the enumerated rights in the
Charter. Not only may a number of administrative practices and specific
military offences be open to question, but so may the tribunals which
form the very basis of military justice. Serious problems arise in trying to
resolve these apparent contraventions because this conflict represents
more than just a discrepancy between a particular set of laws and the
Charter, rather, it is generated by a fundamental clash between the values
of the military community and those of the Canadian society at large.
The Canadian Forces, like those of any country, are maintained
through a much more rigid discipline of its members than is expected of
the general citizenry. Such a discipline is necessitated by the end object of
all military forces: combat. This discipline is instilled and enforced by a
body of military law which encompasses a wide set of prohibitions to
which civilian society is not normally subject, relatively harsh
punishments, and expeditious procedures in the military tribunals that
enforce those rules. When individuals enlist in the Forces, it is assumed
that they voluntarily relinquish much of their personal freedom and agree
to submit themselves to the military justice system. This autonomous
legal system, designed to maintain a rigid order of discipline, is bound to
give rise to a number of possible infringements of the Charter, which
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1. The single concession made by the farmers of the Charter to the uniqueness of the military
legal system is found in s. 11 (f), which provides that the right to trial by jury does not apply
to the prosecution of a military offence in a military tribunal.
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reflects the liberal values of the general civilian society. The resolution of
these Charter infringements involves not only questions of legal
interpretation but also basic political questions regarding the degree to
which the military should differ from civilian society, what rights of
service personnel can reasonably be limited in order to maintain an
effective fighting force, and who should make these determinations.
II. The Scope of Canadian Military Law
Before examining the general question of the application of the Charter
of Rights to military law, however, one must have a clear appreciation of
the range of matters covered by military law and the people subject to it.
The Code of Service Discipline (CSD), contained in the National
Defence Act, provides the backbone of a body of military law that is
fleshed out principally by the Queen's Regulations and Orders
(QR&Os), Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs), and a host
of orders issued at the command, base, and unit levels. The CSD provides
for specific military offences whose nature and penalty are detailed there.
Tliese offences involve both purely disciplinary matters, such as
insubordination or failure to carry out orders properly, and offences that
mix disciplinary and criminal elements, such as striking an officer. The
serious nature of the specific military offences created in the National
Defence Act should be emphasised from the outset; while capital
punishment has been abolished from the Criminal Code, the National
Defence Act still includes eight sections outlining 34 offences relating to
wartime activities which are punishable by death.2 The CSD also
includes two general provisions which add offences from other pieces of
legislation to the military legal system. Section 120 brings virtually all
offences punishable under any federal statute, including the Criminal
Code, within the purview of military law; this section also provides that
the whole range of military offences continue to apply when a person
subject to the CSD is outside the country.3 Furthermore, the CSD
stipulates that all laws of a foreign country where members are serving
may be enforceable under Canadian military law.4 Thus Canadian
military law encompasses a tremendous range of offences and
punishments.
2. Sections 63 - 66, 68 - 70, and 95 of the National DeJence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-4 detail
the capital offences. These offences deal with various manifestations of traitorous actions,
cowardice, mutiny, spying, and the dereliction of duty in action.
3. Section 60 of the National Defence Act excludes several offences under the Criminal Code
from being tried in a military tribunal; these crimes include murder, manslaughter, various
charges of sexual assault, abduction of a minor, and abortion. However, service tribunals have
jurisdiction to try these offences when they are committed outside Canada.
4. S. 121 of the NationalDefence Act.
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The expansive domain of military law, however, has been greatly
restricted by the courts in recent years. In one of only two cases involving
military law to be settled by the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice
McIntyre wrote a concurring opinion in which he said that an offence
should only fall within the realm of military justice "when committed by
a serviceman if such an offence is so connected with the service in its
nature, and in the circumstances of its commission, that it would tend to
affect the general standard of discipline and efficiency of the service". 5
Since this decision, the Court Martial Appeal Court has enforced a
requirement that a "military nexus" must be present in an offence before
it can be tried in a military tribunal.6 One should note, however, that this
rule has only been applied to offences committed within Canada.7
Canadian military law is remarkable in the range of people subject to
the Code of Service Discipline and when they are subject to it.8 Members
of the Regular Forces are subject to the provisions of the CSD at all
times, whether on or off duty, while members of the Reserve are basically
subject only when on duty, in uniform, or on base. However, the CSD
also provides that various groups of civilians are also directly subject to
military law while abroad; in this respect Canadian military law differs
from both the British and American military legal systems. The most
important group of civilians who are subject to the CSD are the roughly
1900 families who live with members of the Forces serving abroad. In
addition, those civilians who "accompany" military units while they are
on service or who are provided food or shelter by the Forces overseas are
covered by the CSD. For example, about 300 civilian school teachers
who work in military schools in Europe are also included within the
ambit of military law. During the period 1971-80, 13.8 per cent of all
courts martial were convened in order to try civilians; the vast majority
5. MacKay v. The Queen (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 129 at 162 (S.C.C.).
6. Military nexus was first applied by the Court Martial Appeal Court in R. v. MacDonald
(1984), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 551, enforced again in R v. Catudal (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 190,
discussed further in R. v. MacEachern (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 439, and expanded upon in R.
v. Sullivan (1986), 65 N.R. 48. The most recent case to deal with the issue is lonson and the
Queen, CMAC File # 259, March 10, 1987. Only brief mention of the issue was made of
military nexus by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nolan and the Queen (unreported), June
25, 1987.
7. Two cases have been settled by the CMAC since MacDonald which have involved civil
offences committed off-base by Canadian military personnel stationed overseas. In Dube and
The Queen, CMAC File # 188, Dec. 2, 1983, a serviceman was charged with assaulting a
German civilian in an off-base bar in Inchenheim, West Germany. In Gregoire and The Queen,
CMAC File # 209, Dec. 10, 1984, the accused was charged with impaired driving on a public
highway in West Germany. In neither case did the CMAC discuss the existence of a military
nexus.
8. Section 51 of the National Defence Act details precisely who is subject to the CSD and
when.
Military Law and the Charter of Rights
of these cases involved dependents, rather than civilian employees. The
importance of the extension of military law to civilians overseas is
underlined by the fact that over 40 per cent of all courts martial held
overseas involved civilian defendants.9
Apart from those directly subject to the offences contained in the CSD,
many civilians in Canada are indirectly subject to other provisions of
military law. All dependents of Forces personnel who live in on-base
housing in Canada must respect a range of regulations and administrative
policies regarding the use of base facilities and behaviour on the base
(such as the prohibition against political activity on military bases). These
policies can be enforced administratively by the Base Commander,
ultimately through his power to evict and thereafter exclude anyone from
the base. Such evictions would cause a family considerable upheaval in
remote postings.10 A significant number of civilians are affected in this
manner, since over 24,000 families live in military housing in Canada. I
The Organizational Society of Spouses of Military Members launched a
challenge in Alberta to this aspect of the application of military law in
September 1985, after the Base Commander of C.F.B. Penhold
prohibited them from holding meetings on the base and from circulating
petitions. This group had been involved in trying to generate support on
the base for such issues as day-care facilities, giving priority to wives in
job hirings, and the establishment of a women's resource centre.
III. Possible Conflicts with the Charter
When the Charter of Rights is compared with the specific provisions of
Canadian military law, a wide array of prima facie infringements of the
enumerated rights can be identified. A brief review of these apparent
contraventions will indicate the variety of challenges the Canadian
military may face through Charter litigation. The discussions which
follow might appear to cast Canadian military law in an unfair light,
because they concentrate on the possible infringement of the Charter by
a particular provision of military law when viewed in isolation, often
without considering what mitigating factors, or balancing benefits, might
also be involved. However, this approach has been deliberately chosen,
and without any intent to colour the reader's view of military law.
9. The figures relating to civilians appearing before courts martial are calculated from
information provided in Hansard, July 9, 1981, at 11368.
10. S. 245 of the NationalDefence Act also makes it an offence for any person to contravene
"regulations respecting the access to, exclusion from, and safety and conduct of persons in, on
or about any defence establishment, work for defence or material..."
11. Toronto Star, October 19, 1985.
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Rather, the following examination of the application of the Charter of
Rights to military law aims to reveal the variety of possible infringements,
in order to provide a clear appreciation of the scope of the issues
involved. Once the potential conflicts with the Charter have been
reviewed, the general principles which would provide a common basis
for the justification of any military infringement will then be dealt with.
The equality provisions of s. 15 of the Charter seem to provide the
most fertile ground for challenging aspects of military law. Inequality is
generated by Canadian military law in two respects: both between
different groups within the armed forces, and between members of the
military as a group and civilians as a group. The issues which have
become the most politically controversial involve the treatment of two
groups within the forces: women and homosexuals. Women have been
excluded from roughly a quarter of the job categories available in the
Forces, since these were designated as combat positions. As a result,
women have faced tremendous disadvantages compared to men in being
promoted to staff ranks, because these senior command positions usually
require some career experience in the combat trades. However, the
Forces are now undertaking trials which are supposed to lead to the
elimination of gender-based occupational barriers. The Forces have
always maintained a general policy of excluding open homosexuals from
enlistment and administratively discharging any who are found to be
already in the service.' 2 The Task Force set up within the Forces to
review the ramifications of the Charter ofRights defended this policy and
concluded that, "the overall effect of the presence of homosexuals would
be a decrease in the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces".
13
Another problem posed by the policies of the Forces is their failure to
recognize common-law relationships in their allocation of on-base
housing and a variety of other benefits. Thus the five per cent of Forces
personnel who have "alternative living arrangements" are deprived of
many of the benefits extended to legally married couples.' 4 One apparent
12. During 1981-4 there were 154 members of the Forces dismissed for this reason under
CFAO 19-20. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-committee (of the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs) on Equality Rights, Issue No. 18,
June 19, 1985, at 32. Although it is not clear whether s. 15 of the Charter protects against
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, this policy has become a matter of political
debate and is raised by the Armed Forces as a possible area of conflict with the Charter. See,
e.g., the evidence of the Forces' senior legal officers before a parliamentary committee: Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
LegalAffairs, April 25, 1985, at 14-6.
13. Canadian Forces' Charter Task Force, FinalReport, Vol. 1, September 1986, Part 4, at 21.
14. Equality Issues in Federal Law: A Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice, 1985) at
61-2.
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violation of s. 15 which the military shares with many civil employers is
the maintenance of a mandatory retirement age. A number of Forces'
policies also discriminate between personnel on the basis of their rank.
For instance, one variation in punishment that depends on the rank of an
offender is found in s.125(6)(b) of the National Defence Act, which
provides that no officer can be sentenced to detention.
The Code of Service Discipline contains several provisions that also
might be challenged for creating inequality between those subject to the
Code and the rest of civilian society. The inclusion of such a broad range
of civil offences in the CSD, which are then tried in military tribunals,
may be vulnerable since the procedures and composition of military
tribunals are quite different from those of the civil courts that would try
the same offences when committed by a civilian in Canada. Although
two court systems may have distinct structures and procedures and yet
provide equal protection of rights, it is not certain that such a justification
could be used here; the discussion later in this paper reveals that the basic
structure of military tribunals may fail to guarantee the independent and
impartial hearings set out in s. 11 (d) of the Charter. In addition, liability
for the summary offences of the Criminal Code is extended under the
CSD well beyond the period provided for in the Criminal Code itself; a
person is liable for any offence under the CSD for three years, while the
civil population is liable for summary offences under the Criminal Code
only for six months after the act was committed.15 The extra-territorial
extension of all federal laws also involves liabilities to which the vast bulk
of the Canadian populace are not subject, especially since the limiting
principle of military nexus does not apply to offences committed abroad.
It should be noted that this extension may in some circumstances also be
beneficial for those subject to the CSD, because they could be tried by
Canadian law instead of the harsher laws of a foreign country. Ironically,
even this advantage might be vulnerable to a Charter challenge since
most Canadians are denied "the equal protection and equal benefit" of
this law.
This discussion of the inequalities generated by Canadian military law
reveals a range of discriminatory policies that relates to groups who are
not specifically mentioned in s. 15(1) of the Charter. There is
considerable debate within academic and judicial circles as to the degree
of protection which the Charter affords to groups who have not been
15. The CMAC looked at this problem in Rutherford and the Queen, CMAC File # 173, June
24, 1983. Although the Court questioned the scope of this extended period of liability, it would
not rule the provision unconstitutional in general application. The court did disallow the
application of this liability in the particular circumstances of the case at hand.
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specified. Thus it is not certain that membership in the Forces, marital
status, sexual orientation, or rank are matters covered by the Charter.
Although it is generally agreed that the list of grounds upon which
discrimination cannot be based is not exhaustive, it is unclear what
principles should operate to determine the range of other types of
discrimination which would contravene the Charter. Nevertheless the full
spectrum of discriminatory policies have been included here in order to
underline the potential conflict between the Charter of Rights and
military law. 16
Several other sections of the Charter of Rights also appear to be
infringed by Canadian military law. One of the most frequently
prosecuted offences, s. 119 of the National Defence Act, may well
infringe the rights guaranteed by s. 7 and s. 9 of the Charter. S. 119
provides that "Any act, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of
good order and discipline is an offence" punishable by up to a two-year
prison sentence and dismissal with disgrace. Such an offence may
contravene the Charter by including a penalty of incarceration for an
offence which is so vague as to allow unacceptably wide discretion to
prosecuting authorities. 7 In addition, the prohibition against political
activity on a military base contravenes the freedom of expression found
in s. 2(b). The ban against a trade union for members of the Forces
constitutes a prima facie infringement of the freedom of association in
s. 2(d). The right to be secure against unreasonable searches may also be
violated by the recently introduced policy of mandatory urine tests for
drug use.
IV. Military Tribunals
Apart from specific offences under the Code of Service Discipline and
general administrative policies, primafacie contraventions of the Charter
also arise with respect to the tribunals which enforce military law. These
infringements and violations of the Charter would fundamentally alter
16. Two recent decisions reveal the differing approaches taken by the courts towards
discrimination based on grounds not mentioned in the Charter. A quite restrictive approach to
non-enumerated grounds of discrimination was taken by Strayer J. in Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories Ltd et at v. A.G. Canada (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (F.C.T.D.). However,
MacDonald J. claimed that the equality provisions of the Charter prohibit any discrimination
which offend the "underlying values of a fair and democratic society". Kask v. Schimizu et el
(1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 64(Alta.Q.B.).
17. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against a similar provision of the Penal
Service Regulations, which makes an offence of an act "calculated to prejudice the good order
and discipline" of a penitentiary. Thurlow C.J. characterized this offence as a "notoriously
vague and difficult charge for anyone to defend". Re Howard and Presiding Officer of Inmate
Disciplinary Court of Stony Mountain Institution (1985), 19 C.C.C. (3d) 195 at 212. The
Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to appeal this decision.
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the Canadian military legal system if they could not be saved under s. 1;
they thus merit close attention. Before the infringements of the Charter
can be analysed, however, a brief description of the various tribunals
which enforce military law is necessary.
Military offences are tried in a variety of tribunals, each empowered to
try offenders of different ranks and hand down different ranges of
punishments. These tribunals fall within two general categories -
Summary Trials and Courts Martial. The vast majority of offences are
dealt with by Summary Trial, where a single officer conducts a hearing
involving a non-commissioned member of his own unit, ship, regiment,
or command.18 The legal procedures, although not the atmosphere, in
these hearings are relatively informal, and are not governed by the
Military Rules of Evidence; a plea as to guilt is not heard, and evidence
is not always taken under oath. Despite the procedural informalities, the
punishments range up to 90 days detention (which automatically
includes a reduction of rank down to Private for any member below a
Warrant Officer) and a fine of up to 3 months' basic pay.19 An accused
has no right to be represented by legal counsel at a Summary Trial; at the
discretion of the presiding officer, however, this representation may
occasionally be permitted as a privilege. An accused is otherwise always
provided with an Assisting Officer to help prepare his or her case. These
Assisting Officers are regular line officers usually drawn from the
accused's unit, and do not have any formal legal training. The decision of
a Summary Trial can only be appealed by the accused through the
Forces' administrative grievance procedures. These reviews do not
involve any further hearings, but are administrative decisions based on
written submissions. There is no procedure for a judicial release of an
offender pending the outcome of an appeal; an offender may only apply
for an administrative release.
The second type of military tribunal is the Court Martial, which is a
formal judicial body. A court martial differs markedly from a Summary
Trial in its composition, procedures, and powers of punishment. While a
Summary Trial resembles a hearing by an inquisitorial magistrate, a court
martial proceeds in an adversarial manner with the defence and
prosecuting counsels leading the presentation and examination of
18. There are three types of Summary Trial: Trial by Delegated Officer, Trial by Commanding
Officer, and Trial by Superior Commander. Chapters 108 and 109 of the QR&Os describe in
detail the offences and offenders which may be tried by each type of Summary Trial, as well
as their powers of punishment.
19. A fine in excess of $200, a reduction in rank, or detention cannot be meted out in a
Summary Trial unless the accused had been given the chance to elect a Court Martial at the
outset. In addition, a sentence by a Commanding Officer for detention over 30 days must be
approved by a superior authority.
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evidence, and the court restricts itself mainly to questions of clarification.
Strict procedural rules apply in courts martial, through the Military Rules
of Evidence. Indeed, some of the procedural rules, especially relating to
prior disclosure of prosecution evidence, afford in theory at least greater
opportunities for defence counsel than do civilian procedures. As with
Summary Trials, there are several types of courts martial, each
empowered to try different classes of offenders and impose different
punishments.20 Unlike Summary Trials, an accused is entitled to legal
counsel in all trials by court martial. Indeed, the Forces provide paid legal
officers to conduct the defence as a matter of course, although an accused
can opt to pay for his own civilian counsel instead. Court martial
judgements can be appealed judicially, first to the Court Martial Appeal
Court, which is comprised of judges selected from the Federal Court and
some provincial superior courts, and then to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Offenders may also apply to the court martial that tried them or
to the Court Martial Appeal Court for bail pending the outcome of the
appeal process. Civilians who are subject to the CSD can only be tried by
court martial.
The two types of military tribunals provide trials which are in some
ways analogous to the distinction in the civil courts between summary
trials and trials by indictment of criminal offences. Major offences
carrying serious punishments are generally prosecuted in courts martial
while a range of minor offences are dealt with by Summary Trial. This
distinction is either detailed by law for serious offences or is made at the
discretion of the convening authority. Military law also creates a middle
ground of offences, where the accused is given the right to choose
between a trial by court martial or a Summary Trial. All foreign and
federal offences, the most serious of the specific military charges, and any
offence which would likely result in incarceration provide an accused
with the automatic right to make this choice. However, the choice is only
extended if the commanding officer has decided against recommending a
court martial trial, because he feels that the powers of punishment open
to him with a Summary Trial are sufficient. The accused has to balance
the particular benefits and risks of the two types of tribunal. The
Summary Trial is quickly disposed of and is limited to punishments of 90
days in detention or less, but there is no right to legal counsel during the
20. There are four types of Court Martial: Disciplinary Court Martial, Standing Court Martial,
General Court Martial, and Special General Court Martial. The offenders who may be tried,
and punishments awarded, all vary with each type of Court Martial; civilians may only be tried
by General Court Martial or Special General Court Martial. See Chapter 111 of the QR&Os
for the details of the composition, jurisdiction and powers of punishment of the various Courts
Martial.
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hearing and no judicial appeal of the result. On the other hand, a court
martial provides the benefits of the right to legal counsel, procedural
guarantees, judicial appeals, and judicial release pending the appeal; but
an accused runs-the risk of a harsher sentence being imposed by a court
martial. In practice, the overwhelmingly majority opt for the lesser
possible punishments of a Summary Trial over the legal rights available
in a court martial.
The only decision given by the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with
the scope of military law and the composition of military tribunals came
in 1980. At that time the Supreme Court of Canada considered the
appeal of a serviceman who argued that his prosecution by court martial
for an offence under the Narcotics ControlAct violated the Bill of Rights'
equality provisions and the right to a trial before an independent and
impartial tribunal. In this case,2' the Court ruled that the existence of a
body of military law, and specialized courts martial to enforce it, did not
infringe upon the Bill of Rights. The majority decision, written by Mr.
Justice Ritchie, held that Parliament could validly construct the CSD,
because it was necessary in order to put into effect the jurisdiction given
to it by s. 91(7) of the Constitution Ac4 1867 to deal with "Militia,
Military and Naval Service, and Defence". The Supreme Court upheld
not only the existence of separate military tribunals to try military
offences, but also the particular compositon of courts martial presently
provided for under the National Defence Act. In essence, the Court
declared that courts martial constituted independent and impartial
tribunals, as set out in the Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in R. v. Valente,22
however, raises fresh grounds for a challenge to the system of military
tribunals. In this case the Supreme Court dealt with a provincial court
judge's refusal to try a provincial traffic offence on the grounds that his
court was not an independent tribunal, and that to proceed with the trial
would violate the accused's rights found in s. 11(d) of the Charter.
Justice Le Dain wrote the unanimous decision which outlined three
elements comprising "a standard that reflects what is common to, or at
least at the heart of, the various approaches to the essential conditions of
judicial independence in Canada. 3" The first factor he identified was the
security of tenure, which he said existed when:
21. Supra, note 5. For a full criticism of this decision's treatment of the application of the Bill
of Rights to military law, see the case comment writen by Marc Gold in (1982), 60 Can. Bar
Rev. 137.
22. (1986), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
23. Id., at 208.
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... the judge [is] removable only for cause, and that cause be subject to
independent review and determination by a process at which the judge
affected is afforded a full opportunity to be heard. The essence of security
of tenure for the purposes of s. 11(d) is a tenure, whether until an age of
retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific adjudicative task, that is
secure against interference by the executive or other appointing authority
in a discretionary or arbitrary mannerY
The other two conditions he outlined were financial security and
administrative independence:
The second essential condition of judicial independence for the purposes
of s. 1 l(d) of the Charter is, in my opinion, what may be referred to as
financial security. ... The essence of such security is that the right to
salary and pension should be established by law and not be subject to
arbitrary interference by the executive in a manner that could affect
judicial independence. . .. The third essential condition of judicial
independence for purposes of s. 11(d) is in my opinion the institutional
independence of the tribunal with respect to matters of administration
bearing directly on the exercise of its judicial function.... Judicial con-
trol over... assignment of judges, sittings of the court and court lists -
as well as related matters of allocation of court-rooms and direction of the
administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions, has generally
been regarded the essential or minimal requirement for institutional or
"collective" independence.25
In its specification of these three conditions for judicial independence,
the Valente decision presents a far more rigorous basis for resolving the
issue of a tribunal's independence than did MacKay. Both Summary
Trials and courts martial appear to be very vulnerable to challenges under
these tests set out in Valente. All types of court martial fail completely to
satisfy the first condition for judicial independence specified by Le Dain
in Valente - security of tenure. There is no permanent and independent
judicial branch within the Canadian Armed Forces. Although trial-level
courts martial are presided over by senior officers with full-time judicial
duties, these individuals only serve three or four years as military judges
before being transferred to another section of the Judge Advocate
General's branch. Furthermore, both the majority and concurring
decisions in MacKay stressed that the existence of an independent Court
Martial Appeal Court, composed of civilian judges, served to protect the
rights of an accused to a trial by an independent tribunal.26 However, the
members of the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) serve only at the
pleasure of the Crown, since the relevant section of the National Defence
Act, s. 209, which provides for their appointment is silent on their
24. Id., at 212-3.
25. Id., at 216, 219,220.
26. Supra, note 5 at 154, 157.
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removal. Thus there is no stipulation that judges sitting on the CMAC are
removable only for cause. This lack of tenure in the CMAC, and in all
trial-level courts martial, clearly poses a prima facie infringement of the
Charter. As Le Dain J. wrote -in Valente, a judge who serves only at
pleasure "cannot reasonably be perceived as meeting the essential
requirement of security of tenure for purposes of s. 11(d) of the
Charter".27
The challenges which can be made under the Charter to the system of
Summary Trials pose the most fundamental problems for the military
system of justice. The prima facie contraventions of the Charter
evidenced by Summary Trials are clear and carry considerable
consequences for the enforcement of Canadian military law, since over
98 per cent of all military prosecutions are dealt with by Summary Trial.
If these challenges to Summary Trials were to be upheld in the courts, the
military system of justice would face a significant transformation. Thus,
these issues require particular attention.
The right to trial by an impartial and independent tribunal appears to
be violated by several aspects of a Summary Trial. Since the officer
presiding at a Summary Trial is almost invariably someone in direct
command over the accused, it must be assumed that a personal
acquaintance between the officer and the accused can often exist. An
accused may have faced the presiding officer on previous occasions in the
course of his regular duties and received informal, or even formal,
warnings from the officer about his behaviour or attitudes. In such
circumstances the presiding officer may well approach the trial with the
intention of "teaching Cpl. X a lesson this time". While this may be a
legitimate consideration for purely disciplinary offences, it is wholly
undesirable for any trials dealing with offences of a criminal nature. An
accused simply cannot be guaranteed an impartial hearing in a Summary
Trial. As Le Dain, J. wrote in his unanimous decision in Valente:
Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation
to the issues and parties in a particular case. The world "impartial"
... connotes absence of bias, actual or perceived. 28
Summary trials also appear to fail any test of independence set out in
Valente. These trials are conducted by line officers as part of their regular
duties. Commanding Officers of a unit conduct trials ex officio, while the
officers in charge of the sections within that unit are usually designated as
Delegated Officers by the Commanding Officer. Thus a change in
posting for a senior officer may automatically include, or remove, the
27. Supra, note 22 at 215.
28. Id., at 201.
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responsibilities of conducting Summary Trials. All officers presiding over
these tribunals are subject to performance evaluations for their career
promotions, and, hence, a portion of their salary increases. These
evaluations could include their performance in Summary Trials. Any
officer is open to censure from his superiors for his handling of Summary
Trials. This raises a particular concern for an officer who might take a
fundamentally different view concerning the nature of Summary Trials
than do his superiors. For instance, if a Base Commander were to
emulate Judge Sharpe of the Valente case and refuse to allow any
Summary Trial to be held because he viewed these tribunals to be in
violation of the Charter of Rights, there is little doubt that he would very
quickly be told by his superiors to cease his obduracy; indeed, he could
open himself to the charge of failing to carry out his duties. Finally,
Summary Trials are run as an integral part of the every day functioning
of a military unit. Thus there is no sense of an "independent
administration" of matters relating to the holding of a Summary Trial.
Since there is no guaranteed security of tenure, or financial and
administrative independence, Summary Trials appear to fail all three of
the tests found in Valente.
Another major problem with Summary Trials is the denial of the right
to legal counsel during their proceedings. As Article 108.03, Note B, of
the QR&Os now states, "An accused person does not have a right to be
represented by legal counsel at a summary trial". At a Summary Trial, an
accused only has the right to the aid of an Assisting Officer, who is a
regular officer with little or no legal training. The Assisting Officer
ensures that the accused understands the discipline process, especially the
choice to be made between Summary Trial proceedings and Courts
Martial, and generally helps in the preparation for the hearing. In
addition, the Assisting Officer is allowed "to assist the accused during the
trial to the extent requested by the accused".2 9 However, a new provision
came into effect in October 1986 to allow the occasional appearance of
legal counsel to represent an accused in a Summary Trial.30 It is entirely
up to the discretion of the presiding officer whether to allow a request for
legal counsel, although the officer is bound by the new provisions to
consider the nature and complexity of the offence, the interests of the
accused, where justice lies, and military exigencies. 31 The presiding officer
may also decide to suspend the trial and recommend that the proceedings
be completed in a Court Martial instead. In a case before the CMAC in
29. Art. 108.03(5) of the QR&Os.
30. Art. 108.03, Note C, of the QR&Os.
31. Art. 108.03, Note D, of the QR&Os.
Military Law and the Charter of Rights
1983,32 it was argued that the denial of representation by legal counsel in
a Summary Trial contravened the right to counsel contained in s. 10(b)
of the Charter. However, the CMAC unanimously agreed that this
section only pertained to a right to counsel at the time of arrest or
detention, and not during a trial. Nevertheless, a right to be represented
by legal counsel at a trial might still be invoked through the "principles
of fundamental justice" referred to in s. 7 of the Charter. A closely
related case is presently before the Supreme Court of Canada regarding
the right to counsel before the disciplinary tribunals of federal
penitentiaries. The Federal Appeal Court ruled in its determination of
this case that a right to counsel did lie in s. 7. Chief Justice Thurlow
concluded:
It is undoubtedly of the greatest importance to a person whose life, liberty
or security of the person are at stake to have the opportunity to present his
case as fully and adequately as possible. The advantages of having the
assistance of legal counsel for that purpose are not in doubt.33
The Forces would likely respond that any person charged with a serious
offence, including any which could involve incarceration, does in fact
have a right to counsel under the present system. If such an offence is set
for trial before a Summary Trial, the accused is formally given the choice
of electing trial by court martial where he or she will be represented by
a lawyer. This election is made a matter of deliberate consideration,
because an accused must wait 24 hours before he can announce his
choice. However, an offender can be punished with confinement to ship
or barracks by a Summary Trial, without having been offered the choice
of trial by court martial. Moreover, the benefits of a much quicker trial
and the strict limitation on the powers of punishment in a Summary Trial
persuade virtually all those faced with the choice to forgo the right to
legal counsel. Thus the exercise of that right involves significant
disincentives. The main issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether the
right is effectively infringed by automatically exposing an accused to
greater punishment for choosing to be represented by legal counsel.
A further challenge can be made to Summary Trials because the
presiding officers usually have had only minimal, if any, legal instruction.
This is of particular concern since Summary Trials deal with many
charges of a criminal nature. One might wonder at the competence of
regular officers to preside at trials where complex legal arguments should,
in theory, be presented. Section 129 of the National Defence Act now
provides, "All rules and principles from time to time followed in civil
32. R. v. Robertson (1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 404, (C.M.A.C.).
33. Supra, note 17 at 210.
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courts that would render any circumstance a justification or excuse for
any act or omission or a defence to any charge are applicable in any
proceedings under the Code of Service Discipline". The essential
problem of Summary Trial is the complete absence of legally trained
personnel in the proceedings, since neither the presiding officer nor the
assisting officer appointed to help the accused has any proper legal
training. In such circumstances it is unclear that an accused fully enjoys
the rights of defence outlined in s. 129 when the offence is prosecuted by
Summary Trial. However, it should be noted that all decisions of
Summary Trials are reviewed administratively as a matter of course, in
order to guard against gross miscarriages of justice. But this process may
provide only the barest of visible protection. The lack of legally trained
presiding officers is also directly linked to the reluctance to allow legal
counsel to appear at Summary Trials. The lack of any legally trained
personnel in these trials might well be in contravention of s. 7 of the
Charter, where the charges carry punishments which affect the liberty of
the accused.
Another fundamental challenge to the system of military justice can be
based on s. 15 of the Charter, since the three types of Summary Trials,
and their punishments, all vary according to the rank of the accused.
Anyone below the rank of warrant officer can be tried by his
Commanding Officer and sentenced to maximums of three months
detention, a fine of three months pay, or a stoppage of up to 30 days
leave; in addition privates can be confined to ship or barracks (for up to
21 days) or be forced to do extra work and drill.34 A warrant officer, or
a commissioned officer below the rank of Colonel, can only be
prosecuted summarily in a trial by Superior Commander, whose powers
of punishment are limited to reprimands or a fine of up to 60 per cent of
one month's pay. However, no officer with the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel or higher can be tried before any Summary Trial or lose the
rights to legal counsel and procedural protections afforded by a court
martial. Thus the military justice system discriminates among those
subject to the CSD purely on the basis of their rank; the tribunal which
tries an offender, the punishment which can be awarded, and the
procedural safeguards necessarily enjoyed by the accused all vary
according to rank. This distinction among ranks, however, has been
upheld by the CMAC.35
34. Officer cadets are also included in the group who can be tried by their Commanding
Officer.
35. Vaillancourt and The Queen, CMAC File # 226, January 14, 1985.
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V. Civilian and Military Values in Conflict
The many possible infringements of the Charter of Rights which have
been reviewed here serve to highlight the contrasts between the particular
society of the military and the general civil society, through the nature of
particular offences, the tribunals which try those charged, and the rights
of an accused. Indeed, most of the apparent contraventions of the Charter
arise because the military system of justice differs so profoundly from the
civil system. These differences reflect the particular sets of values fostered
by the military, and by the civilian society at large. It is necessary to
appreciate that military law is not just a disciplinary code administered
by tribunals within the profession, such as rules governing the legal
profession or even the police. Rather, military law can be characterized
as a complete legal system for a military society which exists fairly
autonomously within the greater civil society.36
Canadian military law fosters and maintains two values, hierarchy and
discipline, which pervade the Armed Forces to a degree that is quite
foreign to civil society.37 These two values underlie much of the off-duty,
as well as on-duty, life of members of the Forces. While the application
of hierarchy and discipline appears self-evident during duty hours, one
must understand the ways in which hierarchy also operates in the social
relations between members of the military. Members of the Forces have
their social life directly affected by such means as the Mess system, which
provides social facilities only within particular rank groupings.
Furthermore, "fraternizing" (read romance) among the ranks is still
heavily discouraged. The emphasis placed on hierarchy also affects those
military personnel and their families who live on base. On large bases,
military housing may be geographically organised according to rank; thus
Captains and Lieutenants can live on different streets from more senior
officers, while quarters for warrant officers, NCOs, and enlisted ranks
may be kept distinct.
36. The notion of a military "society" may be contentious, but the discussions which follow
underline the distinctness of the military community. Brig.-General (Ret'd.) David Broadbent
also refers to military "society" throughout his discussion in "Military Society: Change or
Decay? Part One" (1982), 11 Canadian Defence Quarterly (4) 24; Part Two in (1982), 12
Canadian Defence Quarterly (1) 28. The U.S. Supreme Court also refers to a separate, military
society; see especially Parker v. Levy (1974), 417 U.S. 733 at 743.
37. Hierarchy and a unique discipline are far from the only particular values which distinguish
military society from the general civil society. Peter Kasurak has compiled a list of values
which he feels comprise a "military ethos": "The group is valued over the individual; soldiering
is a vocation, a calling, rather than an occupation; honour is more highly regarded than
material gain; the military community is paternalistic; symbols, ritual and myth are valued; and
the military community is necessarily separate from the civilian society which it protects"; in
P. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the Military Ethos: Civil-Military Relations in Canada,"
(1982), 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 108 at 124.
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Military law also generates a particular kind of discipline, in its
reliance on quick trials of an offender by a superior officer. In general,
one may characterise military discipline in Canada as being enforced
expeditiously, with fairly harsh punishments, and in tribunals which rely
on the hierarchy of the Forces. The harshness and expediency of military
law has been underlined in some public statements by senior officers. For
instance, a former Assistant Judge Advocate General to Maritime
Command, Colonel DesRouches, has said of military justice: "It may be
severe but it is knowingly severe. The guys know if they get involved in
certain things they are going to get thumped".38 The expeditious nature of
military. justice was underlined by the previous Vice Chief of Defence
Staff, Vice Admiral Mainguy, when he told a parliamentary committee
that, "in our system justice is speedily and properly done".39 And, as we
have seen, the military justice system reinforces the value of hierarchy,
both in its provision for different tribunals and punishments according to
the rank of the offender and in the basic organisation of tribunals where
superior officers try subordinates.
The hierarchy and the particular sort of discipline fostered within the
military run counter to values which have gained increasing prominence
in Canadian civic society. The past several decades have witnessed both
a growing assertion in Canadian political culture of egalitarianism and
the enactment of legal protections for a range of civil rights. The
importance of equality issues in Canadian political culture is readily
illustrated by the introduction of such social welfare measures as state
medical insurance and legal aid, by the heightened priority of women's
issues on the national political agenda, as well as by the fierce defence of
universality in recent debates concerning family allowances. During this
period, civil rights have come under an increasing range of legal
protections, starting with the federal Bill of Rights in the 1960s, the
provincial and federal Human Rights Acts which were passed since then,
and, finally, in the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter of Rights.
40
The Charter represents a fusion of the trends towards greater equality and
the protection of civil rights.
The clash between military and civilian values lies at the root of the
contraventions of the Charter posed by the military legal system. Since
the Charter presents the courts with powers of substantive review, the
38. Halifax Chronicle Herald, February 27, 1985.
39. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Justice and Legal Affairs, April 25, 1985 at 21.
40. For a further discussion of the growth of legal protection of civil rights, see: Cynthia
Williams, "The Changing Nature of Citizen Rights," in A. Cairns and C. Williams,
Constitutionalisnm Citizenship and Society in Canada, 1985.
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military is faced with the possibility of having important pillars of
military society and discipline questioned, and perhaps invalidated, by
civilian judges. The military may lose control of the distinctiveness of its
society because of Charter litigation, since civilian values may come to be
imposed upon the military by the civil courts.
The acquisition and imposition of civilian values is a sensitive issue in
Canadian military circles and had become a bone of contention even
before the advent of the Charter. The potential for change to be forced
upon the military by Charter decisions may well exacerbate the
resentment of "civilianization" already felt in many quarters of the
Forces. The federal government's Task Force which in 1979-80 reviewed
the unification of the armed services found extensive evidence of a feeling
among military personnel that civilianization, especially at the National
Defence Head Quarters in Ottawa, was eroding the effectiveness of the
Forces:
Some witnesses claimed that too many decisions affecting the daily lives
of service personnel were being made by civilians who were not
(sufficiently familiar with the details of service life... It was also held that
flfis perceived civilianization had resulted in a loss of focus on the "sharp
end".41
The Armed Forces set up a Review Group to study the report of the Task
Force. The Review Group, headed up by Major General Vance, also
stressed the problem of civilianization, although their report suggested the
Task Force had missed the real nature and gravity of this threat:
The source of concern is not, as was reported by the Task Force, the large
number of civilians involved in military business. Rather, it is the gradual
imposition upon the Department as a whole, including military members,
of civilian standards and values in managing the Forces and in assessing
their needs and goals. The dilemma facing the Forces as a profession is that
civilian standards and values are displacing their proven military
counterparts and, in the process, are eroding the basic fiber of Canadian
military society. At the risk of overstating the situation, the Forces are
facing a crisis of the military ethos.42
The problem, as perceived by the Review Group, is a matter of clashing
values that has caused a "difficulty in reconciling operational
effectiveness under war conditions with the demands of socialization in
areas like human rights and freedom of information". The long-term
41. Task Force on the Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, Final Report (Ottawa:
Department of National Defence, 1980).
42. Review Group of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces,
Report (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1980) at 18.
532 The Dalhousie Law Journal
effects of this clash of values were viewed as posing a serious threat to the
capabilities of the Forces:
The issue facing the Forces is simply put: in the absence of clearly defined
and defensible military values, the Canadian Forces are steadily turning to
civilian values. If this trend persists, the continued weakening of the
military profession as it has been known is predictableI 3
Thus, the concern of a number of senior officers in the Forces is to
maintain combat effectiveness in the face of the pressures of
civilianization. The challenges posed by the Charter to long-standing
military policies, especially with respect to combat roles for women and
the system of Summary Trials, are viewed as serious threats to the Forces'
ability to remain effective in the field. The civilian penchant for
expanding civil rights is regarded by many senior officers as not readily
applicable to the Forces. Indeed, when the Charter was first enacted the
military apparently sought a general exemption to the Charter, but this
move was resisted by the Justice Department.
Once it was clear that the military would not gain a blanket exemption
from the Charter, however, the Forces began a comprehensive evaluation
of their policies in order to determine what changes would be
necessitated. In 1982 and 1983 the Forces implemented a number or
changes to the departmental regulations, the QR&Os, in order to
accommodate the Charter. These new regulations were mainly
concerned with the s. 10 rights of an accused upon arrest or detention.
More extensive amendments to Canadian military law were effected in
1985 when the National Defence Act was amended as part of the
omnibus bill which brought greater conformity to the Charter among a
wide range of federal laws. These changes included: the provision of bail
pending appeals to the CMAC; guarantees of speedy release, where
feasible, after someone has been taken into custody; search warrants and
arrests were to be made on "reasonable grounds" rather than "suspicion";
all defences available to an accused in the civil courts were extended to
military trials; military personnel were no longer subject to the double
jeopardy of being liable to trial and punishment in both civil and military
courts for the same offence; some measures of discrimination were
removed - previously, the application of the CSD to females was
amended by regulation44; and the age barrier to members of a court
martial was removed. Some of these changes were adopted directly as a
result of some criticisms levelled at the military justice system by Justice
43. Id., at 19.
44. The regulations which amended the application of the CSD to women were, for the most
part, paternalistic measures to "protect" women from the harshness of military discipline. For
example, no woman could be sentenced to detention.
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McIntyre in his concurring opinion in MacKay. These legislative
amendments were put into effect in changes made to the QR&Os in
October, 1986. Provision was also made at that time for the discretion to
permit legal representation in a Summary Trial. The Chief of Defence
Staff declared that these amendments "represent the best balance that
could be achieved between the Charter rights of individuals and the need
to maintain the operational effectiveness of the CF".45 Thus, it is unlikely
that more changes will be made in the near future to further
accommodate the military justice system to the Charter.
Potentially the most far-reaching change to the Forces' administrative
policies came with the announcement in February, 1987 by the Minister
of Defence, Perrin Beatty, that women would no longer be excluded, in
principle, from the "combat trades". Instead, he declared, "Acceptance
for employment in specific occupations must be based on gender-free
physical standards which accurately reflect the nature of employment in
them".46 This new policy will be phased in after extensive trials have been
held in order to test the efficacy of gender-free physical job requirements
and the integration of women into existing combat units. This elimination
ofsexual discrimination in job classifications came about after the
Charter Task Force, set up within the Forces under the direction of Brig.-
Gen. McLellan, presented its final report in the Fall of 1986; this report
contained a comprehensive examination of the role of women in the
Forces, which concluded with the recommendations that are now being
implemented.4 7 Just with this one policy change, the Charter of Rights
will have forced a fundamental readjustment of values in the military
community.
Despite the changes in policy which the Forces have initiated, there
still remains, as we have seen, a wide variety of other apparent
infringements of the Charter. A number of dilemmas arise in determining
whether these infringements should be considered to be justifiable
limitations on the rights in the Charter, or whether the military must
adapt its policies even further. Two issues in the application of the
Charter of Rights relate to its impact on morale and effectiveness. On the
one hand, the Forces are concerned that major amendments to military
law might weaken morale among service personnel because of the
resentment towards civilianization; furthermore, there is the concern that
some measures would directly erode the ability to maintain the level of
45. CFAO 1600-48-86, 19 September 1986, p.4.
46. Speech delivered by Hon. . Beatty, Minister of National Defence, at the University of
Toronto, February 5, 1987, p.12 .
47. Charter Task Force, FinalReport, September 1986, Vol. I, Part 3.
534 The Dalhousie Law Journal
discipline required for combat effectiveness. As Major R.G. Rousseau
cautioned in his study of military discipline:
En essence, la discipline militaire i laquelle tous doivent adh6rer
volontairement est l'outil essentiel de l'efficacit6 des forces arm.es. A notre
avis, son abandon, ou quelque reldche qu'on pourrait &re tent6 de lui
apporter, resulterait rapidement en un dsordre et une anarchie g6n&ale.45
Thus, any substantial changes to military law should be resisted, in this
view. On the other hand, morale amongst service personnel might also be
threatened if it is perceived that they are being denied valuable rights
which the rest of Canadian society enjoys. As a former Assistant Judge
Advocate General, Lt.-Colonel J.B. Fay, wrote in criticizing the military
justice system as it existed in the early 1970s:
When the serviceman has confidence in his commanders and believes in
the organization, there is discipline... It is from military law that the
serviceman receives his most tangible indication of the relationship
between himself and those who command. It is under military law that he
is tried and punished. If the military law system is ajust system, then it will
be recognized as such by the serviceman and thus it will promote and
support the discipline upon which the military organization is based.49
If the military justice system fails to accommodate the Charter to the
greatest extent possible, there is a danger that military discipline would be
undermined in the long-term by the perception that military justice is
unjust. At some point the efficiency of the Forces and the recruitment of
quality personnel will be eroded by the perception that members of the
military are unfairly deprived of benefits enjoyed by civil society. Indeed,
a certain amount of attrition among Forces personnel is already
attributable to discontent with the differences between service and
civilian life.
Although there is general agreement that there must be some difference
between military and civil society, and thus between the military and
civilian justice systems as well, there is little agreement on the scope of
that difference.
VI. The Challenge of Judicial Review
Serious difficulties arise in trying to settle the criteria upon which to
balance an acceptable variation between military and civil norms. It is
also unclear who should make this determination. Initially, the courts will
play a pivotal role as challenges are made to military law through the
48. Maj. R.G. Rousseau, "La Discipline et le Sens de l'Humain" (1984), 14 Le Revue
Canadienne de DUense, (3) 30 at 33.
49. Lt.-Colonel J.B. Fay, "Canadian Military Law: An Examination of Military Justice"
(1975), 23 Chitty's Law Journal 120 at 123.
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Charter. This situation puts both the military and the courts into a new
relationship in which neither party appears comfortable. The Forces are
used to being controlled by civilian authority through Cabinet and
Parliament, but they are not used to being the subject of substantive
judicial review. Neither are the courts used to dealing with military
values. In the past, civil courts appear to have charted a course of
deference to the military's own assessment of what is necessary to the
effective functioning of the Forces. The courts may continue to defer to
the judgment of military leadership and excuse military infringements of
the Charter. If, however, the courts use the Charter to strike down
important elements of military law, then Cabinet and Parliament may
eventually be forced to review the place of military values in modem
society. Former Defence Minister Eric Nielsen told a parliamentary
committee in 1985 that the government might consider exempting
certain aspects of the Forces from the Charter.50 The government has
apparently decided to wait until the courts have pronounced upon the
military's administrative policies and legal system before deciding upon
further action.
As a result, the discrepancies between military and civil society that are
reflected in clashes with the Charter will be resolved in the first instance
by the courts. The judiciary will have to resolve the conflicts between
civilian and military values through a consideration of arguments raised
under s. 1 of the Charter. This section states, "The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Thus the courts
will decide whether or not the infringements of the Charter posed by the
military are reasonable limits and demonstrably justified.
In R. v. Oakes5 , the Supreme Court of Canada provided a framework
of analysis for the consideration of whether specific contraventions of the
Charter may be saved under s. 1. Chief Justice Dickson wrote the
majority decision, which stated, "The onus of proving that a limit on a
right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society rests upon the
party seeking to uphold the limitation";52 thus the burden falls squarely
on the Forces to justify the contraventions of the Charter posedtby their
policies. The court held that two "central criteria" must be fulfilled by a
party seeking an exemption under s. 1. The first stipulation is that the
50. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee (of the House of Commons
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs) on EqualityRights, June 19, 1985, at 10-11.
51. (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
52. Id., at 346.
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objective which gives rise to the limitation must be important enough to
weigh against the rights guaranteed by the Charter. "It is necessary, at a
minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and
substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized
as sufficiently important".5 3 Since the object of any aspect of military law
is to provide an organized and disciplined force to defend the nation, this
criterion appears to be amply satisfied. The other criterion raised by the
Chief Justice actually is a proportionality test comprised of three points:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on
irrational considerations. In short they must be rationally connected to the
objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective
in this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom
in question: R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at
352. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the
measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom,
and the objective which has been identified as of "sufficient importance".5
The tests laid out in Oakes bear a striking resemblance to the questions
proposed earlier by McIntyre J., in his concurring opinion in MacKay,
for determining whether a separate body of military law strayed
unacceptably from "the equal application of the law". He said that one
needs to inquire:
• . •Whether any inequality has been created for a valid federal
constitutional objective, whether it has been created rationally in the sense
that it is not arbitrary or capricious or based upon some ulterior motive or
motives offensive to the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and
whether it is a necessary departure from the general principle of universal
application of the law for the attainment of some necessary and desirable
social objective. .. .[D]epartures should be countenanced only where
necessary for the attainment of desirable social objectives, and then only
to the extent necessary in the circumstances to make possible the
attainment of such objectives.55
Dickson C.J.C., however, seems to have signalled a more stringent
application of his test in Oakes, by stressing that a rigorously applied
"preponderance of probability" should be the standard of proof used to
settle the questions raised:
Having regard to the fact that s. 1 is being invoked for the purpose of
justifying a violation of the constitutional rights and freedoms the Charter
was designed to protect, a very high degree of probability will be, in the
words of Lord Denning, "commensurate with the occasion". Where
53. Id., at 348.
54. Id.
55. Supra, note 5 at 159-60.
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evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a s. 1
inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent and
persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of imposing or
not imposing the limit .. A court will also need to know what alternative
measures for implementing the objective were available to the legislators
when they made their decisions.56
The Oakes decision also placed the discussion of s. 1 in the context of its
existence as a guarantee of the rights included in the Charter. The only
limits to those rights that can be tolerated are those which are justifiable
in a democratic society: "The underlying values and principles of a free
and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a
limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be
reasonable and demonstrably justified. '57 Thus, it would seem that the
values against which a contravention of a Charter right by military law
must be balanced are those of the general civil society, and not those of
the military society itself. As a result it would not be open to a court to
utilize the sort of logic used in 1 v. Vadeboncoeur, where the CMAC
denied bail on the grounds that it was not a part of customary military
life:
When a person enlists or accepts a commission, he or she submits to all the
laws, rules, conditions, traditions and customs of military service. Among
those is the well-accepted tradition that no judicial procedure exists for
bail either before or after conviction.58
The general approach which the Supreme Court of Canada may adopt
in future challenges to military law is unclear. The Court's composition
has changed significantly since MacKay was decided in 1980. Only Beetz
J. remains from the majority that upheld all aspects of military law. The
other three of the four remaining members of the Court took quite critical
approaches to military law. The present Chief Justice Dickson supported
McIntyre J.'s concurring opinion which said, "The principle which
should be maintained is that the rights of servicemen at civil law should
be affected as little as possible considering the requirements of military
discipline and the efficiency of the service".59 The fourth justice who
remains from the MacKay decision is Estey J., who supported the strong
dissenting opinion written by the then Chief Justice Laskin in which trial-
level courts martial were castigated for lacking sufficient independence to
try offences against the ordinary criminal law.60 The addition of five new
56. Supra, note 51 at 347-8.
57. Id., at 346.
58. (1982), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 439 at 440 (C.M.A.C.).
59. Supra, note 5 at 160.
60. Id., at 137.
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members to the Court, however, makes it quite difficult to foresee the
direction of the Court. Little indication of the Supreme Court's view of
military law was revealed in the Court's recent decision in R. v. Nolan61,
which was a non-Charter case dealing with the powers of military police
to enforce the Criminal Code with respect to off-base offences committed
by civilians. In limiting the general powers of military police to enforce
the Criminal Code only with respect to those subject to the CSD, the
Court relied upon the application of fairly clear statutory provisions.
Unfortunately, the denial of leave to appeal in the first two Charter
challenges, Muise and Sullivan62, has deprived us of the opportunity of
receiving some early guidance from the Court on the relationship
between military law and the Charter of Rights. 63
VII. The Ambiguity of Military Necessity and Military Nexus
Although individual provisions of military law depend on their own
particular justifications, all arguments to be made in answer to the Oakes
tests under s. 1 are tied to the central theme of military necessity; Le.,
certain deviations from the civilian norms expressed in the Charter are
necessary to the basic organization and efficient functioning of the armed
forces. While the concept of military necessity seems simple enough,
profound differences of interpretation and scope can abound, even within
the military itself. These differences are amply demonstrated in two
articles written by some senior Canadian officers. Major-General D.C.
Loomis and Lt.-Colonel D.T. Lightburn strongly argued that battlefield
requirements must form the basis for all policy decisions. Since modem
civilian society does not promote the attitudes necessary in combat,
effectiveness on the battlefield can only be guaranteed when the military
is set aside from the greater society in order for it to foster the sorts of
values needed. They claim that the opposite has occurred in Canada, to
the detriment of the fighting ability of the Forces:
What appears to have happened during the last decade in Canada is that
an attempt has been made to integrate our military sub-culture into the
main body of Canadian society: the sharp-toothed guard dog has been
taken into the home to be made a family pet, so to speak.64
61. Supra, note 6.
62. Id
63. Beetz J. was joined by three of the newer members of the Court on the panels -which
refused leave to appeal in Muise (Le Dain and Lamer JJ.) and Sullivan (Le Dain and
LaForest JJ.). Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin, December 23, 1985, p.1476; June 27,
1986, p.9 16 .
64. Maj.-Gen. D.C. Loomis and Lt.-Col. D.T. Lightburn, "Taking into Account the
Distinctness of the Military from the Mainstream of Society" (1980), 10 Canadian Defence
Quarterly (2) 16 at 19.
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Thus, Loomis and Lightburn would argue that military necessity would
lead to the Forces being kept as distinct as possible from civil society.
Brig.-General (Ret'd) David Broadbent, however, holds a rather different
perspective. Although he fully agrees that for changes implemented in the
armed forces "the basic test has to focus on the demands of future
conflict", he does not feel that this consideration necessitates a deep
division between the military and civil societies.65 Indeed, he contends
that "military forces are generally in greater danger of failing to adapt to
changed circumstances than of adopting changes that imperil military
effectiveness". 66 While he recognizes that the military is essentially
conservative and reluctant to adopt new values, he asserts that it is vital
for the Forces to recognize the changes which do arise in Canadian
society and adapt to them as closely as possible:
A military force exists to safeguard the interests and values of the society
it defends. Thus, if the force is to be more than a mercenary attachment,
it would be foolish to assert that its value structure can be in opposition to
that firmly established in the society it serves to protect.. . . [In the longer
run either there is a close affinity of values or the military ceases to be a
group of citizens-in-arms and becomes estranged from its parent society.67
Finally, Broadbent makes an observation about military necessity which
is all the more germane in the light of Vadeboncoeur: "At root, the
management of change in the affairs of armed forces requires a
willingness to differentiate between 'traditional necessities' and 'necessary
traditions'".
68
These two contrasting approaches to military necessity are clearly
reflected in assessments of the sort of military discipline that must be
maintained, and the kind of tribunals that must try offenders. For
example, the previous Judge Advocate General, Brig.-General
Karwandy, defended the existing structure of Summary Trials, and the
lack of legal counsel in their proceedings, on the grounds of military
necessity. Karwandy once told a Senate committee, "The system of
summary trials is central to the whole idea of discipline within the
Canadian Forces", and "the system simply could not operate if an
accused were to be represented by counsel". 69 His argument relied mainly
on the difficulty of providing counsel to units who are overseas on peace-
keeping duties, or to ships at sea; he added that in wartime these
65. Supra, note 36, Part One, at 26.
66. Id., Part Two, at 28.
67. Id., Part One, at 25-6.
68. Id., at 30.
69. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence if the Senate Committee on National Defence, May
19,1981, at 11.
540 The Dalhousie Law Journal
difficulties would mount tremendously. However, these considerations of
military necessity may have been over-emphasised. As a former Assistant
Judge Advocate General, Lt.-Colonel Fay, pointed out:
Assistance of any nature can be dispatched by air at short notice. A
military president of a Standing Court Martial can leave Ottawa on a
Friday night and try a case in Cyprus on Monday and be back into his
Ottawa office on Wednesday morning. There is no real isolation of units,
men, or commanding officers.70
Although there may still be instances where practical difficulties are
insurmountable, one must wonder whether the whole system of justice
must operate as if the problems of those particular situations apply
constantly throughout the military. The great majority of Canadian
service personnel are stationed in Canada, and yet they are all dealt with
by a system of justice that is geared to meet the problems of isolated units
on extended duty or in some future combat. As Brig.-General Broadbent
has argued, one can "bring the normal code of military discipline into
closer harmony with the civil code, but with provision, under emergency
conditions, for the quicker justice and simpler process required by the
circumstances of combat".71
Unfortunately, the related notion of "military nexus" does not appear
any more amenable to general agreement than military necessity.
Military nexus is a pivotal concept, since the legal grounds for
prosecuting a civil offence in a military tribunal depends upon the
existence of a clear connection between the offence and the dictates of
military discipline. At present, there is no set of guidelines with which to
establish objectively whether a military nexus pertains to an individual
case. The military leadership is against enacting a dividing line between
offences which can or cannot be tried under military law. Vice-Admiral
Mainguy testified before a parliamentary committee that, "Trying to
draw a line by some sort of legislation as to what is military and what is
civilian in our view is virtually impossible".72 The CMAC has been
equally reticent to draw up a test to aid in determining military nexus,
even on a case-by-case basis. In R. v. MacEachern, Mr. Justice Addy
deliberately refused to adopt the guidelines used by American courts to
establish a military nexus. The American courts employ a 12-point test,
known as the Relford factors, which gives a fairly clear method for
70. Supra, note 49 at 163.
71. Supra, note 36, Part Two, at 29.
72. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee of the House of
Commons on Justice andLegalAffairs, April 25, 1985, at 21.
Military Law and the Charter of Rights
prosecuting authorities and judges alike to determine whether a case
should be tried in a military tribunal.73 Nevertheless, Addy, J. opined:
I do not feel, however, that the Relford factors or anything approaching a
comprehensive series of tests listing the existence of various factors should
be laid down. On the contrary, each case should be considered according
to its particular circumstances. Suffice it to say that the nexus must be real;
although it need not be physical or tangible. In my view, a nexus capable
of truly affecting the morale, the discipline or the efficiency of the military
would suffice.74
Unfortunately, as we have seen, there is considerable disagreement about
what is or is not necessary to maintain the morale, discipline, or efficiency
of the military. In the next case in which the CMAC had to determine the
existence of a military nexus, 1. v. Sullivan75, a different panel of judges
adopted the core of Relford's rationale, although not the 12-point test
itself, to settle the particular case at hand. In the most recent case to deal
with the substance of military nexus, Ionson and The Queen76, yet
another panel of judges ignored the Relford factors completely, and
settled the matter for the particular case by citing previous decisions
which underlined the military's profound interest in eradicating the use of
drugs among service members. It remains to be seen, however, if the
CMAC will consider the Relford factors determinative in future cases.
Much of the uncertainty on this point seems to arise because the ad hoc
appointment of panels of judges to hear cases in the Court Martial
Appeal Court leads to inconsistencies.
VI. Military Law and Civil Rights in the United States
As the Relford factors illustrate, Canadian courts might find helpful
guidance in their new relationship with the military by referring to the
experience of the American Supreme Court in weighing the military law
of that country against constitutional rights. The provisions of the U.S.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the American Bill of
73. This test comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Relford v. Commandant of the
US. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth (1971), 401 U.S. 355 at 365-366. See the
discussion of this issue, in relation to the MacKay case, by Marc Gold, supra, note 231, at
144-6.
74. (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 439 at 443 (C.M.A.C.).
75. (1986), 65 N.R. 48 (C.M.A.C.).
76. CMAC File # 259, March 10, 1987.
The Supreme Court of Canada briefly mentioned military nexus in the concluding paragraph
of Nolan, supra, note 6. In that case the accused had been seen speeding on a base, was stopped
just outside the gates by military police, and subsequently charged with refusing the
breathalyser. The Court held that these circumstances created a sufficient military nexus for the
military police to lay criminal charges against the accused, a civilian.
542 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Rights differ in many respects from Canadian law, but a comparison may
nevertheless provide some insight into which military infringements of
civil rights might be considered "demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society".7 An example of the statutory differences between
the CSD and the UCMJ is the absence in the American code of any
inclusion of foreign laws. However, what is perhaps of more interest are
the measures which have been studied by the U.S. Supreme Court to
determine whether they are invalid for infringing upon the Bill of Rights.
The scope and application of military law were progressively limited by
several decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1950, the Court denied the
military authorities jurisdiction to try service personnel who had left the
armed forces before they were charged for the offence. 78 In a series of
cases in 1957 and 1960, the Court ruled that neither civilian employees
overseas 79, nor civilian dependents accompanying service members
overseas80, can be prosecuted for military offences during peacetime. The
case which restricted military jurisdiction the most, O'Callaghan v.
Parker, was decided by the Warren Court in 1969. Justice Douglas
wrote the majority opinion which made a number of derogatory remarks
about the standards of military justice, such as "a military trial is marked
by the age-old manifest destiny of retribution justice". He added that
"history teaches that expansion of military discipline beyond its proper
domain carries with it a threat to liberty".81 As a result the court laid
down that, although the UCMJ included all federal offences and many
state crimes in its general clause, the military could only try offences with
a "service connection", Le., military nexus. This notion of a service
connection was further refined in 1971 by the Burger court in the Relford
case mentioned earlier.82
Since the Relford decision, however, the Court has made a series of
decisions that have upheld the precedence of military interests over a
number of civil rights. For instance, a commander's ability to regulate the
freedom of speech by civilians on military installations83, or by service
personnel84, was upheld by the Court in several cases. In a decision in
77. For a general overview of the provisions of U.S. military law see: D.A. Schlueter, Military
Criminal Justice" Practice and Procedure (Charlottesville, 1982).
78. Toth v. Quarles (1950), 350 U.S. 11.
79. Mckelroy v. Gugliardo (1960), 361 U.S. 281; Grasham v. Hagan (1960), 361 U.S. 278.
80. Kinsella v. Singleton (1960), 361 U.S. 234; Reid v. Covert (1957), 354 U.S. 1.
81. (1969), 395 U.S. 258 at 265-6.
82. Supra, note 73.
83. Greerv. Spock (1976), 424 U.S. 828.
84. Parker v. Levy (1974), 417 U.S. 733; Brown v. Glines (1980), 444 U.S. 348; Secretary of
the Navy v. Huff(1980), 444 U.S. 453.
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1976,85 the Court upheld the constitutional validity of Summary Courts
Martial, despite the denial of a right to legal counsel before these bodies.
In this case, the majority decision ruled that the participation of legal
counsel would unnecessarily draw out the proceedings of these trials:
"Such a lengthy proceeding is a particular burden to the Armed Forces
because virtually all the participants, including the defendant and his
counsel, are members of the military whose time may be better spent than
in possibly protracted disputes over the imposition of discipline".86 It
would be rather surprising, however, if defendants would agree with the
Courts that time could normally be better spent than in defending
themselves against a period of incarceration for an offence they might not
have committed. In Parker v. Levy, the Court rejected the arguments that
a general article of the UCMJ, which is similar in effect to a combination
of sections 119 and 120 in the CSD, was void because of its vagueness.
The broad attitudes of the Court towards the relationship between
military law and the constitutionally entrenched rights were summarized
by some passages in this case:
The Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized
that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of
its own during its long history. The differences between the military and
civilian communities result from the fact that "it is the primary business of
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise". Toth (1950), 350 U.S. 11 at 17... The fundamental necessity for
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline may
render permissible within the military that which would be constitution-
ally impermissible outside it.87
Thus, the American Supreme Court has become much more deferential
to the military over the course of the 1970s.88 The Supreme Court has
built up a considerable body of case law in which the notion of military
necessity has been given a very wide application in justifying
infringements of civil rights by the military. Indeed, Major Stanley Levine
85. Middendorf v. Henry (1976), 425 U.S. 25. It should be noted that the Summary Court
Martial has no direct equivalent in Canadian military law. It is most like a Summary Trial, but
it is not conducted by an officer normally in command over the accused. The range of
punishments are more restricted (to a maximum of one month's incarceration) than those of
the Summary Trial. Article 15 of the UCMJ also provides for "non-judicial" punishments to
be given out in a hearing by a commanding officer. Although a great range of offences may
be disposed of in these Art. 15 tribunals, the powers of punishment are severely limited, Le.,
"corrective custody" may be imposed for up to seven days.
86. Id., at 45.
87. Supra, note 84 at 743,758.
88. For a comprehensive review of the American Supreme Court's approach to military law
during the 1970s see: S.J. Kaczynski, "From O'Callaghan to Chappell: The Burger Court and
the Military" (1984), 18 U. of Richmond L. Rev. 235.
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notes that many of that Court's decisions that upheld military interests
over civil rights were actually in opposition to the more liberal positions
taken in those cases by the Court of Military Appeals; as a result, fewer
appeals are being taken from the CMA to the Supreme Court.
89
Canadian courts could rely on the logic of these American decisions if
they wished to maintain the uniqueness of military society and uphold
particular provisions of Canadian military law in the face of challenges
under the Charter. Nevertheless, a comparison with American military
law would also open the CSD to challenges relating to the inclusion of
civilians and foreign laws within its ambit, as well as to the extended
period of liability for criminal offences to which a person is subject under
the Code.
IX. Conclusion
The application of the Charter of Rights to military law presents a great
range of apparent contraventions. At the heart of any justification for
these infringements lies the fundamental issue of how different the
military society should be from the general civil society. Initially, at least,
this issue will rest with the judiciary. If the courts do strike down
elements of the military legal system, the government will face the
dilemma of either exempting these measures from the Charter or
introducing further amendments to ensure compliance. The Canadian
Forces will need to present the courts with coherent arguments based on
what measures are necessary in order for the military to function
effectively in the defence of the nation. However, assessments of military
necessity and military nexus involve not only concrete calculations, but
questions of emphasis, preference, and conjecture as well. Even among
the military, there are clear differences of opinion. If the courts merely
defer to the assessments of the military, there is a danger that these issues,
which involve the subjective balancing of civilian values against military
interests, will be settled by the chain of command; thus the views of the
most senior officers may prevail by virtue of their positions alone.
Therefore, the courts should be encouraged to require detailed arguments
from the Forces when they seek to justify a limitation of the Charter of
Rights under s. 1. Indeed, under the test set out in Oakes, the direct
connection between the infringing policy and military necessity must be
clearly established. Furthermore, the Forces may have to explain why
some other arrangement, which did not infringe the Charter to the same
extent, would not be suitable. The justification for an infringement of the
89. Major S. Levine, "The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts" (1980), 79
Military L. Rev. 3 at 24.
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Charter by the military should be made on the grounds of necessity,
rather than expediency, convenience, or tradition. As Wilson J. wrote in
Singh, "Certainly the guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they
could be ignored because it was administratively convenient to do so".9
In the end other courts will have to strike a balance that represents the
military's need to maintain the structures and level of discipline necessary
to wage war, while protecting the civil rights that can in fact be enjoyed
by service personnel and their dependents.
90. Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422 at
469 (S.C.C.).
